This theoretical paper discusses some conceptual and methodological obstacles that one encounters when analyzing the contextual determination of thinking in psychology. First, we comment upon the various representations of the 'cognitive' individual that have been formed over the years -from the epistemic subject to the psychological subject, and finally, to the psychosocial actor. Second, we recall the main criticisms of 'methodological solipsism' found in cognitive psychology research, and we discuss heuristic methods for analyzing the contextual determination of thinking in psychological studies. Finally, we propose an analysis of some data using the approach based on interlocutory logic as a way to formalize reasoning moves and their transformations in the unfolding interaction. Copyright © 2011 S. Karger AG, Basel The idea that conversational interaction organizes the contents of thought, and even structures the operations of thought, is an old assumption. Within the last century, this thesis has been developed considerably, so that today it belongs to a complete and coherent paradigm at the junction of epistemology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, sociology -owing to ethnomethodology and its extension, 'conversational analysis' -, and of course, psychology. Such a thesis is not the least surprising: human beings are social animals living in continuous interaction with their congeners, and the natural form of human interaction, using an expression from Schegloff's [1991] work, is talk-in-interaction.
are regarded as valid for all children who are at the same level of development. They are the general forms of knowledge, i.e., those of an 'epistemic subject' that formed the basis of the Piagetian framework. In his first writings, Piaget [1923 Piaget [ /2002 Piaget [ , 1924 Piaget [ /1928 Piaget [ , 1932 Piaget [ /1977 ] regarded a child's cooperative behaviors as the main responsible factor for the emergence of rationality, i.e. for the construction of mental operations (initially concrete then formal). Thus, he initially suggested a social explanation of cognitive structures by stressing the fact that the mental operation appeared as the child, escaping gradually from preoperative egocentrism, profiting from the stimulations generated by the symmetrical exchanges between peers that are based on the reciprocity of points of view and on mutual respect, in contrast with the adult/child asymmetrical exchanges. Later, when he highlighted a form of 'logic of sensorimotor action,' before verbal language ability, Piaget acknowledged he had overestimated the role of language and the social interaction in cognitive development [Ducret, 1990] . He would maintain thereafter the idea that cognitive structures and mental operations come from the subject's own coordination and from his/her self-regulation of actions, even if he formulated the assumption of a close relationship between cooperation (or interindividual coordination of actions) and the constitution of operative structures (or intraindividual coordination of actions and operations):
Cooperation itself constitutes an issue of co-operations: to put in correspondence (which is an operation) operations of one of the partners with those of the others, to join together (which is another operation) the knowledge of a partner to that of the others, etc.; and, in case of disagreement, to eliminate contradictions (which supposes an operative process) or especially to differentiate the points of view and to introduce a reciprocity between them (which is an operative transformation). [Piaget, 1977 Thus, the social factors were relegated to the status of necessary but nonsufficient conditions for the construction of knowledge [Piaget & Inhelder, 1966 /1969 . In the same way, the symbolic function was regarded as subordinated to the individuals' operative competences, and language only got an instrumental status in human thinking emergence:
Language is not sufficient to explain human thought because the structures, which characterize it, plunge their roots into action and into sensorimotor mechanisms which are deeper than the linguistic fact. But it is not less obvious, in return, than the more refined the structures of human thinking are, the more necessary language is to achieve their development. Language is thus a necessary but nonsufficient condition of the construction of logical operations. It is necessary because without the system of symbolic expression that language constitutes, the operations would remain in the state of successive actions without ever being integrated in simultaneous systems or simultaneously embracing a whole of interdependent transformations. In addition, without language, the operations would remain individual and consequently would be unaware of this adjustment which results from interindividual exchange and co-operation. [Piaget, 1964, pp. 112-113] However, a more detailed analysis of Piaget's research brings to light the social dimension of his theory, even if he did not translate this dimension into an empirical research program, because his top priority was to study the construction of necessary knowledge [Lourenço & Machado, 1996] . Contrary to merely true knowledge, necessary knowledge goes beyond the functional explanations as well as the social regularities. Yet, it did not prevent him from recognizing, in his last writings, that the Contextual Determination of Human Thinking 207 Human Development 2011; 54:204-233 epistemic subject was not so universal as he had admitted it up to then [Bringuier, 1977 [Bringuier, /1980 : [Jean-Claude Bringuier] -We cannot imagine that reality can teach us something about itself out of the scientific mind. [J.P.] -Yes, if you like. But, there is a Chinese science which went extremely deep … So I wondered about the problem of knowing if one could imagine a different psychogenesis from ours and which would be that of the Chinese child at the great era of Chinese science, and I think that it is the case. [Bringuier, 1977 /1980 Actually, if we put this aspect of Piaget's model into perspective in his historicocultural context or if we read Piaget's theory from 'the interior' [Lourenço & Machado, 1996] , it seems that setting social factors aside is related to his rejection of the social empiricism of his time. Whatever option we take, as Chapman [1988 Chapman [ , 1991 indicated, the in-depth study of the social (and cultural) characteristics of cognitive development remains compatible with the frame of mind of Piagetian theory. For this purpose, Chapman [1991] proposed to integrate in a single model the communicative and operative components of social interaction that Piaget used on various occasions. Such an integration would transform the binary structure of knowledge (subject/object) and of social interaction (subject/other) into a ternary structure: 'The substance of both criticisms can be addressed simultaneously in the proposal that human knowing involves an irreducible epistemic triangle, consisting of an active subject, the object of knowledge, and a (real or implicit) interlocutor, together with their mutual relations' [Chapman, 1991, p. 211] . As we will see further, such assumptions led to reinterpret the pragmatic dimension of situations and exchanges.
From the Epistemic Subject to the Psychological Subject
Parallel to epistemological research, the functional conditions for knowledge acquisition began to be evoked in studies spurred on by the results of Inhelder's [1943 Inhelder's [ /1968 Inhelder's [ , 1954 Inhelder's [ , 1955 seminal work. Inhelder and her colleagues engaged in a research program on operative training aimed at 'showing, in an experimental way, that real cognitive progress can be obtained from children, as (soon as) they do training exercises that unbalance their cognitive system' [Morgado & Parrat-Dayan, 2002, p. 650] . Inhelder, Sinclair, and Bovet [1974] developed analyses for cognitive advancement that were no longer about the epistemic subject but about the 'psychological' subject. In other words, they adopted a functional approach to a real individual called 'microgenesis.' By contrast, the individual psychological subject [Inhelder et al., 1976; Inhelder & Piaget, 1979] is studied by an observer who attempts to detect the dynamics of the subject's behaviors, his/her goals, his/her choice of means and controls, and his/her own heuristics that can lead to the same result in different ways, in order to penetrate psychological functioning and establish the general characteristics of procedures or finalized and organized sequences of actions … The heuristic distinction between epistemic subject and psychological subject simply reflects complementary forms of development of the subject's knowledge, which tends either toward normative knowledge or pragmatic and empirical knowledge. [Inhelder & de Caprona, 1992, p. 21] In order to study such an issue, Inhelder and her colleagues have used the 'methodology of experimental intervention in the processes of training form' 2 [Inhelder, 1966] , which Morgado and Parrat-Dayan [2002] summarized as follows: a pretest and two post-tests composed of Piagetian tasks on the studied field are presented to each child. The participants of the experimental group are assigned to several trainings with 'operative exercises' whose purpose is to 'grasp the microchanges of the child's behaviors in detail, the transpositions of procedure during the operative exercise as well as the confrontations between answers and the experiment's intervention' (p. 651). As the authors pointed out, the introduction of the second post-test into the experimental design constitutes 'a real methodological innovation;' that is fundamental to assert the stability of cognitive progress. This research avenue became essential when empirical evidence brought to light cognitive lags in the development of knowledge, which introduced 'disorder' into the theoretical model:
The problem of cognitive lags 3 … continuously triggered studies and controversies within the last two decades, to the point of questioning the relevance, even if only the descriptive relevance, of the concepts of structure and stage, and it stressed the importance of 'functional' aspects in cognitive tasks, more specifically -at least in our own work -the role of representations, of the meaning attributed by the subject to perceptual data and even to the transformation action. [Gréco, 1985, p. 78] Thus Gréco [1985] recommended calling on the 'pragmatics of cognitive activities.' Thereafter, research on cognitive functioning and development has focused on the cognitive processes themselves, i.e., independently of their relationship to cognitive skills. Solving procedures were analyzed specifically (i.e., the way stages or subgoals follow each other, and the path a child's thought takes when he/she is following a given target). To do this, a method of interactive observation was used, which is more appropriate to the study of strategies for solving problems: the experimenter's interventions were analyzed as an 'integral part of the resolution process which is managed by the subject, that is, as a situational variable' [Saada-Robert, 1992, p. 141] . This approach has shed a new light on the status of errors. Whereas in the structural approach, an error is a point of arrival that reveals the state of cognitive structures (for example, focusing on the length of the lineups of tokens to assess the number of tokens indicates the nonconservation of number), the error becomes a starting point in the functional approach. It can explain the subject's self-guidance, i.e., his/her 209 Human Development 2011; 54:204-233 cognitive progress and 'mechanisms of control' for solving the problem. Two kinds of problems held the attention of Inhelder's team : (a) What is the relationship between success and comprehension? (b) Does success lead to some progress in comprehension, or does comprehension come from cognitive conflicts revealed by partial failures? Consequently, this approach to the 'authentic' subject uncovered the idea that an individual's knowledge determines both the meaning that he/she attributes to the problem situation and the control he/she exercises over the task [Inhelder et al., 1974 Piaget & Garcia, 1987 . Thus, Bärbel Inhelder's research threw a new light on cognitive development while being interested above all in the psychological subject and in the functional aspects of thinking of 'a knowing subject, but with his/her intentions and values' [Inhelder & de Caprona, 1992, p. 22] . It provided rich microdevelopmental descriptions of the subject's problem resolution in real time, thanks to the focus on new observable data that are the sequences of actions and the temporal unfolding of behavior 4 . Inhelder's analyses enabled us to detect the child's own guidance of his/her reasoning more and more clearly, from the analysis of meanings he/she attributes to his/her own actions and strategies for the advancement of his/her cognitive discoveries:
The équilibration [one of the great functional processes identified by Piaget] is the foundation of the genesis of the structures and expresses a constructivism of an epistemological type. We could wonder with Cellérier if it should not be supplemented by a more psychological dimension by observing the subject working in microgeneses which lead to create innovations. Indeed it is essential to work out a psychological constructivism which would be a theory of innovation. [Inhelder & de Caprona, 1992, p. 28] According to Houdé [1998 Houdé [ /2004 ], Inhelder's work allowed us to initiate a connection between the Piagetian structuralism and the cognitive psychology of data processing:
According to Cellérier's analysis, the Piagetian structuralism deals with epistemic transformation from action to knowledge in the long run, while cognitivism deals with pragmatic transformation from knowledge to action, in the short run. These two psychologies 'work' on different scales of time: one on a diachronic scale (macrogenesis or development), the other on a synchronic one (microgeneses on a given level of development). The challenge of the Neopiagetian psychology is to articulate these two viewpoints. The research trend which most explicitly took up this challenge, in the 1980s, is neostructuralism, represented in particular by Juan Pascual-Leone, Robbie Case, Graeme Halford and Kurt Fischer. (p. 133, French edition) Toward a Psychosocial Actor An additional step toward understanding concrete situations was taken when research began to focus on the cognition of homo quotidianus, i.e., when researchers began to take into account the social conditions of cognitive development, which is one of the questions that was not clearly studied by Piaget. Since the 1970s, a number of speculative assumptions have been circulating. Researchers in developmental social psychology [Doise, Mugny, & Perret-Clermont, 1975] proposed the sociocognitive conflict thesis to explain the fact that, under certain conditions, working in dyads leads to greater individual cognitive benefits than working alone [Ames & Murray, 1982; Bearison, Magzamen, & Filardo, 1986; Doise & Mugny, 1981 /1984 Emler & Valiant, 1982; Mugny, 1985 Mugny, /1991 Perret-Clermont, 1979 /1980 . The Swiss researchers, while proposing to test the assumption of the structuring role of the 'conflict of communication' stated by Smedslund [1966] , enriched the theoretical and empirical investigations of the 'conflict' concept in cognitive development. The 'cognitive' conflict, which allows thought to progress, was regarded as emerging either from invalidation of an assumption due to observations producing intellectual dissatisfaction [Inhelder et al., 1974; Lefebvre & Pinard, 1972] , or from confrontation with situations in which the subject's operative schemes are nonsufficient to solve the problem; an internal disturbance emerges and then causes an unbalance and a search for compensation, which leads to new schemes or to the complexification of old ones [Inhelder et al., 1974] . The 'sociocognitive' conflict is at the root of 'the hypothesis of cognitive conflict experienced and resolved socially' [Doise et al., 1975, p. 382] : the contradiction with the individual's system of answer explicitly finds its source in the system of answers of one or more individuals [Mugny, Perret-Clermont, & Doise, 1981] . In other words, it is an outstanding conflict of viewpoints between at least two people about the same object. As Psaltis, Duveen, and Perret-Clermont [2009] pointed out, the question was to capture the social dimension of the Piagetian decentration. In addition, they underlined that in this work, interpersonal coordinations are described as preceding the interiorization of intrapersonal coordinations, thus calling into question the Piagetian assumption that considered that the social and cognitive dimensions of thinking are finally the two faces of the same piece, expressing the same logic of the coordination of actions in different forms [Piaget, 1947 [Piaget, /1950 [Piaget, , 1965 [Piaget, /1977 [Piaget, /1995 .
A retrospective analysis brings out three successive stages in the experimental study of the social conditions of cognitive development in which the place allowed for social context has gradually changed [Gilly, 1991; Sorsana, 1999] .
Study of the Systems of Interaction and Measurement of the Cognitive Effects.
Initially, researchers focused on the mechanisms of action of social interactions, without considering the role of social meanings: they focused their attention on the study of the systems of interaction -observing performances after working in dyads or alone, and partners in interaction were regarded as 'interchangeable.' Explanatory assumptions of cognitive progress were proposed in terms of imitation [Winnykamen, 1990 ], of sociocognitive conflict [Doise & Mugny, 1981 /1984 Doise et al., 1975; Mugny, 1985 Mugny, /1991 Perret-Clermont, 1979 /1980 or of destabilization (of task representation as well as solving procedures), and social control [Gilly, 1991 [Gilly, , 1988 [Gilly, /2001 Gilly, Fraisse, & Roux, 1988 . The social dimension was perceived here as influencing the cognitive activity. In this way, the initial thesis of the sociocognitive conflict depends more precisely on the following proposal [Sorsana, 2003] : a social condition which is favorable to individual cognitive progress is a cooperative interaction between two (or three) individuals who are led to produce (verbal and/or gestural) contradictory answers, and who are cognitively engaged in going beyond this social and cognitive disturbance. The simultaneity of incompatible answers is supposed to lead them to take into account the other's answers, and in a corollary way, decentrate from their own point of view. Moreover, new information included in the partner's answer is supposed to draw the attention on new features of the task (new representations and new solving procedures). Then, the will to go beyond disagreements in a sociocognitive mode (and not by submission) [Mugny, De Paolis, & Carugati, 1984] would lead to the interindividual coordination of actions and ideas which will be interiorized by each partner. They will then become new mental tools involving a new cognitive organization. In the very first experimental Swiss research used within this theoretical framework, the independent variable was the social dimension with generally two modalities, 'working in dyad' versus 'working alone.' The dependent variable corresponded to the evolution of the experimental groups' performances between pretest and posttests. This kind of analyses measured the effects of acquisition . Three types of data in posttests enabled the researchers to evaluate structural change [Psaltis et al., 2009] : (a) performance differences observed in the posttest were stable over time evidencing cognitive progress and underlying structural change, (b) children were able to generalize their very new knowledge to other tasks that had the same operative structure, and (c) new forms of reasoning were identified because the new conservers uttered new arguments (never mentioned in the unfolding interaction phase). However, comparing cognitive levels at different times (before and after test) only makes it possible to compare the product of cognitive change, but not the process [Granott & Parziale, 2002] . This 'first generation of studies' 5 developed in Switzerland provided empirical evidence of the effects of social interaction, focusing on the child 1-child 2 interaction system [Schubauer- Leoni & Perret-Clermont, 1997] . Today, we can say that such studies inferred the sociocognitive conflict process by, to some extent, comparing 'static' states. This amounts to inferring the movement from pictures only, according to Granott and Parziale's [2002] metaphor when they compared state-oriented versus process-oriented approaches in development and learning. What is the precise nature and function of the interindividual coordination of points of view, which are the process probably central to the transformation of interindividual functioning into intraindividual functioning [Vygotski, 1934 [Vygotski, / 1962 ?
Study of the Solving Procedures and First Links between Cognitive Effects and
Acquisition Process. Several criticisms were formulated concerning the sociocognitive conflict thesis [Blaye, 1989; Flieller, 1986; Russell, 1982; Russell, Mills, & ReiffMusgrave, 1990] . The criticism related to the insufficiency of the observations carried out during the co-resolution phase constitutes one of the weaknesses that has inspired a complementary research trend [Dalzon, 1988 [Dalzon, /2001 Gilly, 1991 Gilly, , 1988 Gilly, /2001 Zhou, 1988 Zhou, /2001 . These researchers supplemented the very first analyses by introducing the analysis of solving procedures observed during the unfolding interaction, aimed at apprehending the acquisition processes . How do children proceed concrete-ly when they work together? Will the ways of acting together then be used as tools to build new individual reasoning?
Studying solving procedures puts forward the role played by social meanings and practices related to the tasks, and more generally by the social contexts of resolution of these tasks. Social context and cognitive development have begun to be regarded as overlapping and indissociable since researchers highlighted that regulations of a social nature which govern a given interaction -such as norms, conventions, representations, familiar social rules, contract of communication involving roles and expectations -can also generate new cognitive coordinations. Some researchers preferred to insist on the role of social meanings and practices that are dependent on the type of the task: they developed the social marking thesis [De Paolis, Doise, & Mugny, 1987; Doise, Dionnet, & Mugny, 1978; Gilly & Roux, 1988; Zhou, 1988 Zhou, /2001 . Research undertaken in cognitive psychology on the pragmatic schemas of reasoning can also be included here [Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Girotto, 1991; Girotto, Blaye, & Farioli, 1989; Girotto, Gilly, Blaye, & Light, 1989] . Other researchers chose to study social meanings and practices that are dependent on the social contexts of resolution: they developed research based on the concepts of contract [Schubauer-Leoni & Grossen, 1993; Schubauer-Leoni & Ntamakiliro, 1998 ] or modes of social integration [Monteil, 1995; Monteil & Huguet, 2001] . Finally, other researchers considered the role of the social meanings concerned in the relational history of the partners in interaction. They observed that the nature of the relationship shared between partners -positive relationship versus negative one -overdetermined the cognitive management of tasks, by affecting the cognitive processes used by the dyad: children in 'friend' dyads had more exchanges which were more elaborate and more critical than children in 'not-friends' or 'indifferent' dyads; they interacted in a cordial work environment (laughter, exclamations, teasing) characterized by reciprocity of exchanges, and they were more attentive, more respectful, and more demanding of each other. All of these are behaviors that allowed them to take their partner's suggestions into account [Bukowski, Newcomb, & Hartup, 1996; Dumont & Moss, 1996; Kutnick & Kington, 2005; Nelson & Aboud, 1985; Newcomb & Bagwell, 1995; Sorsana & Musiol, 2005] .
As Psaltis et al. [2009] pointed out, this 'second generation of studies' -an expression that we can extend to all research of this period (including non-Swiss research) -granted a more institutionalized role to social variables: the task is not only an activity that a child carries out with two or three partners (if we include the presence of the experimenter). To solve it, children use the set of social parameters related to it. So the task is perceived as having a power of 'mediation' [SchubauerLeoni & Perret-Clermont, 1997] , which can express a system of social positions between the partners and the 'agent' [Psaltis et al., 2009 ], because it is carrying an institutionalized history defining the situation as well as one's position and that of others. These investigations are also prolonged in the studies led by Mugny and his collaborators in social psychology [Quiamzade, Mugny, Falomir-Pichastor, & Chatard, 2006] .
Study of the Discursive Activities and In-Depth Analysis of the Links between Cognitive Effects and Acquisition Processes.
We consider the third stage of the experimental study of the social conditions of cognitive development to correspond to the fact that researchers have taken into account discursive activities in their analyses. If it is Contextual Determination of Human Thinking 213 Human Development 2011; 54:204-233 true that 'conversation and reasoning are being built at the same time' [Trognon, SaintDizier de Almeida, & Grossen, 1999, p. 139] , then discursive activities must reflect the link between cognitive effects and acquisition processes. However, at that time, the idea of 'interindividual coordination' of actions (and ideas) had only been examined by looking at the partners' solving procedures. It was not until the 1990s [Gilly, Roux, & Trognon, 1999; Light & Perret-Clermont, 1989 ; Perret-Clermont, Schubauer-Leoni, & Trognon, 1992] that researchers in this field started paying attention to utterances, also considered to be actions. More specifically, they were interested in the discursive 'grounds' in which solving procedures are empirically embedded [Clark, 1992 [Clark, , 1996 [Clark, , 1999 . They began to study such 'interindividual coordination' as a process anchored in negotiation, negotiation that no longer pertained solely to what we do together but also to what we say about what we do, thanks to pragmatics.
6 Today, contemporary analyses consist of identifying the conversational 'materials' that carry (or even constitute) the 'mindprint' of the operations that build knowledge, as we will specify further [Gilly et al., 1999; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006; Sorsana, 2003 Sorsana, , 2005 Sorsana & Musiol, 2005; Teasley, 1995; Trognon, Batt, Schwarz, Perret-Clermont, & Marro, 2006; Trognon, Sorsana, Batt, & Longin, 2008] .
Contextual Determination of Human Thinking: What Method(s) of Analysis?
The contemporary endogenous conception of cognitive development posits 'as distinct a priori the social and the cognitive, and had [sought] a posteriori their possible articulations, [which] amounts to considering communication on one side and representation on the other side as two independent entities, and to wondering, afterwards, how we will be able to put them together' [Caron-Pargue, 1997, p. 10] . However, how can communication and representation be articulated? Obviously, the idea that comes immediately to mind is that it is thanks to interaction. And, it is true that owing to the interactionist research trend since the 1960s, the study of 'inter'-behaviors has gradually taken the place of 'intra'-behaviors [Cosnier, 1998 ]. Because it gave interaction a fundamental role, this shift of focus contributed to specify the essential role of action as a source of knowledge and as an organizing principle of thought. For example, in the specific domain of infant cognitive psychology, the impact of action moved from actions on objects to actions on human relationships, but the fundamental role of action seems to be preserved [Lécuyer, 1996 [Lécuyer, , 2006 . Given that interactions, here, are social actions, interactional behaviors are necessarily intersubjective. However, even if intersubjective participation 7 is considered in current concepts of 'psychological state,' 'propositional attitude,' 'modality,' and in axiological expressions, it remains difficult to conceptualize this subjectivity 'objectively' even though such a conceptualization appears to be more and more epistemologically essential [Auchlin, 1990] . A possible way to conceptualize intersubjectivity consists of analyzing a fundamental property of interaction, that is, its sequential ordering [Duncan Sorsana /Trognon & Fiske, 1985; Schegloff, 1991] . As Schegloff's (1991) work showed, sequentiality indeed creates the possibility of a 'third position repair' that 'may be thought of as the last systematically provided opportunity to catch (among other problems) divergent understandings that embody breakdowns of intersubjectivity, that is, trouble in socially shared cognition of the talk and conduct in the interaction' [Schegloff, 1991, p. 158] . By creating such an opportunity, sequentiality acquires a function of scaffolding of intersubjectivity. At the same time, this function constitutes a procedural solution to the problem of intercomprehension, which is at the core of semiotic communication [Trognon, 2002; Trognon & Sorsana, 2005] when we try to tackle this question from a theoretical point of view.
From Methodological Solipsism of Cognitive Psychology to the Study of Pragmatic Structures of Knowledge
To reach this goal, we will deal especially with linguistic interaction: 'language and more particularly conversation may be a place where this controversy is likely to be overcome, by considering that communication and representation are only two indissociable faces of the same entity that one could divide up differently' [CaronPargue, 1997, p. 10] . Language, considered as an internal process in the past, is now also being studied from the point of view of its use in cognitive psychology [Hilton, 1995; Politzer, 2004; Politzer & Macchi, 2000; Van der Henst, 2002] . However, even though Bernicot and Trognon [2002] announced a 'pragmatic turning point in psychology,' much ground remains to be covered. brought our attention to the fact that in Western cultures, the answer to the question 'What does it mean ''to speak''?' contains the idea of a prototypic individual who speaks all alone! Such a conception is based on the way cognitive psychology generally analyzes language functioning, which is considered as an internal process because the cognitive system does not have access to what is outside it [Fodor, 1983] . According to Fodor, cognitive processes in psychology can only study computational operations carried out on internal representations (which are strings of symbols). Two stages are described: (a) the translation of mentalese into natural language (or vice versa) via a specialized module, and (b) reprocessing by the central systems in order to integrate the translation into the subject's knowledge system. However, only the first stage (which is modular, and goes from the phonetic input to the logical form of the statement) can be studied scientifically. Such a process conveys the idea that cognitive subjects are monads closed within themselves, each one developing his/her own computational activity, and whose communication can be only the result of a pre-established harmony. Grice's maxims are precisely conceived in order to protect this harmony: like two well-set clocks that mark the same hour without having to interact, in the same way, two subjects can share the same representation because they apply the same rules. [Caron, 1997, p. 222] A consequence of such an assumption is that it dissociates language and communication by considering communication as a purely internal phenomenon, too, as it is assumed in Sperber and Wilson's [1979/1995] relevance theory. These authors claimed that language does not exist for communication but for data processing; its use for communication is an accident specific to mankind -similar to the elephant's use of its trunk, which is an olfactive organ, to grab things is an accident specific to that species! In fact, this 'narrow' idea about the individual is shared throughout the cognitive territory. Schegloff wrote,
In the Western tradition, it is the single, embodied, minded individual who constitutes the autonomous reality. Organized aggregations -whether of persons or of activities -tend to be treated as derivative, transient, and contingent. They are something to be added on, after basic understandings are anchored in individual-based reality. It has accordingly seemed appropriate in the cognitive science to study cognition in the splendid isolation of the individual mind or brain and to reserve the social aspect for later supplementary consideration. [Schegloff, 1991, p. 168] Still today, the cognitive tradition has some difficulty being separated from a 'general approach in which the individual is considered as a generic entity of a species equipped with information-processing mechanisms and not as an operator viewed in his/her individuality or his/her specificity from an ergonomic, clinical, or differential point of view' [Dubois, 1993, p. 38] . However, the increasing interest in the study of 'concrete situations' has given birth to the need to broaden research on human cognition by 'situating' individuals in the entire set of practices that constitute their daily activities [Greenfield & Lave, 1982; Hutchins, 1995; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Light & Butterworth, 1992; Rogoff, 1990; Rogoff & Angelillo, 2002; Saxe, 2002; Suchman, 1987; Valsiner, 2009] . Among the multiple dimensions of these ecological situations, researchers are now interested in the actual reasoning strategies and procedures carried out during conversations, in real time, by concrete individuals, to the detriment of the epistemic subject who was so crucial for Piaget. In line with the 'situated cognition' research developed more particularly in the United States than in Europe, 'real time' studies have made the complexity of daily situations salient. To reach a goal, logical reasoning that goes from the premises to the conclusion is not enough, but depends on interactions with and between various dimensions of the situation [Weill-Fassina, Rabardel, & Dubois, 1993] . In other words, explanatory models of cognitive functioning are focusing more and more on contexts and actors' interpretations as a function of the implication of the situation, the goals of the action, and the subject's experience [Light & Butterworth, 1992; Politzer, 2004; Politzer & Macchi, 2000; Vallée-Tourangeau & Krüsi Penney, 2005; Vallée-Tourangeau & Payton, 2008] . Consequently, in human sciences, too, explanatory models are enriched by introducing random elements. Moreover, we settle less and less for 'modeling mental tasks that are well-defined in terms of their initial data but have ill-defined goals from the operator's point of view' [Weill-Fassina et al., 1993, p. 15] .
So, the cognitive approach today is encouraged to take into account two facts that are observable in concrete situations: (a) An individual's cognitive functioning involves interaction with others, and (b) this interaction brings language into play in a critical way. This means trying to re-examine some concepts in a more rigorous -and empirically founded -manner: among them, inference, representation, and language concepts. Sorsana /Trognon Rather than starting from an idealization of cognitive functioning, certain researchers including Clark [1992 Clark [ , 1996 Clark [ , 1999 proposed an opposite approach, i.e., starting from empirical observations of language functioning:
His approach is essentially different from the former one [Fodor's approach] in that he adopts, in relation to language, what he calls the action view (which starts from what people do with language in order to find out how it functions) as opposed to the product view (which starts from the structure of language in order to find out how it appears in speech - Clark, 1992, p. xiii) . Language use involves a joint process -the partners' adjustment. [Caron, 1997, p. 226] .
Consequently, the methodological solipsism claimed by Fodor, rather than defining the scientificity of cognitive psychology, it reveals its essential weakness. The cognitive subject is not a monad: he/she permanently interacts with his/her environment and in particular with others. Accounting for this interaction, and in particular for the verbal interaction that is undoubtedly the most elaborated form of interaction, constitutes an essential challenge for cognitive psychology. [Caron, 1997, p. 234] Some researchers have tried to meet this challenge by raising the following issue [Politzer, 2004; Politzer & Macchi, 2000] : if the study of reasoning begins by analyzing the interpretation of the premises in context, we must re-examine all of the paradigms using pragmatics. Granted, but not any pragmatic 8 approach. In the above perspective, it is 'talk-in-interaction' that is the specific topic of pragmatics because our understanding of the world and of one another is posed as a problem and resolved as an achievement, in an inescapably social and interactional context -both with tools forged in the workshops of interaction and in settings in which we are answerable to our fellows. Interaction and talk-in-interaction are structured environments of action and cognition, and they shape both the constitution of the actions and utterances needing to be 'cognized' and the contingencies for solving them. To bring the study of cognition explicitly into the arena of the social is to bring it home again. [Schegloff, 1991, p. 168] 
What Method(s) of Analysis?
Contextual determination of human thinking gradually became essential in psychology. As Grossen [2001] pointed out, we can identify three common views of the concept of context. Each view leads to a different definition of psychology's object of study. On the one hand, to the question 'Where are cognitions?', researchers who focus either on the epistemic subject or on the psychological subject implicitly as-sume that cognitions are necessarily located in the brain. This 'psychology of the individual' defines context as 'a set of discrete variables' [Grossen, 2001] that are likely to influence the subject's cognitive functioning and that the researcher can manipulate (e.g., variables such as task instructions, the individual's preliminary knowledge, management of participants' identities and roles, etc.). This dualistic conception of relationships between the subject and the object acknowledges the role of the physical and social environment, but, in a correlative way, considers that we can isolate what concerns the individual him/herself. Thus, even a constructivist version of human development, which acknowledges that internal reality is not a simple reflection of external reality, does not account for the fact that 'to think', 'to express emotions', 'to state one's opinion', etc. are activities that are always socially-directed, and therefore also depend on the particular way in which actors construct meanings within a heterogeneous discursive space. [Grossen, 2001, p. 68] On the other hand, researchers who focus on the psychosocial actor rely on one of the following definitions of context mentioned by Grossen [2001] . (a) When the context is regarded as the fruit of an intersubjective construction, researchers consider that cognitions are not inside the individual, but in a specific space that both pre-exists to individuals' meeting and is constituted by their interactions. This heterogeneous and dynamic space is created and moved thanks to the construction meaning, places, and identities; it is reduced neither to a set of objective characteristics, nor to subjective perceptions that interactants may have. [Grossen, 2001, p. 71] The topic to study is no longer the individual but the socio-discursive processes by which cognitions are accomplished in the interaction that is unfolding, and become social and cognitive resources for participants. (b) According to the situated cognition approach, context is a cognitive system in which both the interdependence of each element relative to the whole and the irreducibility of the whole relative to the parts are highlighted. In other words, to the question 'Where are cognitions?', researchers answer, 'They are inside the system that is formed by interactions between individuals and tools; consequently, the discursive space created by these interactions constitutes only one of the various aspects that characterizes this system' [Grossen, 2001, p. 72] . This defines what Grossen [2001] called the 'psychology of the situation,' but we prefer to call it the 'psychology of the cognitive system' to better emphasize that the human being belongs to the system. How can we study 'human thinking as a fundamentally dialogical and indissociable activity of human communication' [Grossen, 2001, p. 68] ? As well documented by Wertsch [2008] , the child can develop self-regulative capacities by functioning in communicative settings involving 'other regulation.' Does an effective prototype of sociocognitive dynamics exist? Gilly et al. [1988 Gilly et al. [ /2001 stressed the difficulties raised by this question and insisted on the fact that the impact of interaction is to be understood using a 'systemic model of sociocognitive functioning' in which the relations of dependence between 'the characteristics of the task, the individual cognitive functioning and the sociocognitive dynamics' appear to be indissociable. Currently, we have studies that make an effort to identify the cognitive level (or the functioning) of the subjects in the pretest/interaction/posttest(s) design. However, they focus on various judgment tasks or resolution tasks. In addition, the behavioral or verbal categorizations used by researchers to specify the partners' sociocognitive dynamics vary Sorsana /Trognon from one study to another, their relevance depending in particular on the analysis levels privileged by researchers (even a transcription of corpus cannot be regarded as a neutral activity). Then, what shall we do? Some researchers take the risk to propose an answer. For example, Mercer [2000] considered his 'exploratory talk ' and Psaltis and Duveen [2006] their 'explicit recognition' as actual types of conversational interactions making it possible 'to think together' while other researchers highlighted the complexity of interpreting an instruction like 'work together' and acting it [Tartas & Perret-Clermont, 2008] . Then, how can we go beyond this composite mosaic of analyses? It would seem that the general proposition is not anymore to create 'reasoned methodological conceptualizations' [Bastien, 1994] but rather to articulate, in a heuristic way, methodologies diversifying the analysis levels before connecting them.
We are convinced that a suitable method for describing and explaining the cognitive system composed of the thinking subjects' behaviors in interaction with others, and of the semiotic systems that they use jointly by reinventing them within their sociocultural environment, must be viewed in line with the microgenetic 9 approach developed in Inhelder's work [Inhelder et al., 1974 . In order to do this, it seems important to promote a microgenetic analysis that clearly locates individuals' activity within the interindividual, semiotic space of training or problem-solving situations. Indeed, a detailed analysis of microchanges in thinking that integrates at least the interindividual and situational level of the sociocognitive organization of an activity [Doise, 1982 [Doise, /1986 ] is likely to guarantee better identification of the sequential processes essential to understanding cognitive progress. Why? Because we assume that the intraindividual (level 1), positional (level 3), and ideological (level 4) levels defined by Doise [1982 Doise [ /1986 are all embedded in the interaction (or level 2) [Trognon, Batt, Bromberg, Sorsana, & Frigout, in press] . Indeed, in Inhelder's approach, it is only gradually that we think we are able to identify the pathways taken by the subject, in order to detect his/her procedures or action sequences. There is a part of inference making in our analysis, but a certain degree of objectivity will be attached to it when we confront the observers' points of view and use video recordings in a reasoned way, which allows us to avoid both an obsolete mentalism and the illusion that a pure reading of experience is possible. [Inhelder & de Caprona, 1992, p. 24] Confronted with a concrete task to be solved with a partner, participants decide by themselves how they will act instead of being confronted with an alternative whose terms are imposed by the experimenter. Moreover, because solving a problem is in keeping with social actions and interactions, their respective modes of reasoning are made 'publicly' available to others and consequently to observers. So it becomes possible to describe and to formalize these modes of reasoning, their transpositions, and/or their transformations in the unfolding of the interaction.
Contemporary microgenetic analyses seem to be primarily related to a psychology of the individual [Granott & Parziale, 2002; Siegler & Crowley, 1991; Siegler & 9 'The concept of microgenesis encompasses the idea of working on another temporal scale than that of macrogenesis, but more generally, the idea of analyzing cognitive behaviors in great detail and all their natural complexity. Studying microgeneses uncovers the characteristics of the subject-object interaction process, which was analyzed in too general a way by Piaget. It allows one to detect potential coordination and integration of the succession of partial solutions and models made by the subject' [Inhelder & de Caprona, 1992, p. 24] . Human Development 2011; 54:204-233 Svetina , 2002, 2006] . Microgenetic analysis of sociocognitive interactions should be attempted. Currently, these detailed analyses are carried out from protocols based on experimental designs. We can distinguish two principal methods of interaction analysis: (a) a systematic coding of behaviors and/or speech from predefined categories [Mercer, 2000; Olry-Louis & Soidet, 2008; Psaltis & Duveen, 2007; Tartas & PerretClermont, 2008] , and (b) formal analyses of verbal interactions aiming at demonstrating reasoning raising from conversations [Trognon et al., 2006 [Trognon et al., , 2008 . We can criticize the use of categorizations because, by doing so, it implicitly conceives that interaction is a closed system. Formal analyses, when they are based on a constructivist method -for example, the natural deduction and dialogical logic -provide a procedure that takes into account the fact that representations are being built gradually and are embedded in the social action and interaction. However, expensive in time, such formal analyses cannot be applied to the interaction in extenso. Nevertheless, each method mentioned above has integrated the need to be rooted in the fundamental characteristic of interaction, which is its sequential ordering.
Formal Analysis of Sociocognitive Interactions: An Illustration
Why is it important to favor a formal analysis of the verbal interactions in problem-solving situations or training? On the one hand, using a formal language to analyze psychological phenomena is, in the long term, likely to make the studies truly comparable and to reach a cumulative knowledge in psychology rather than to consider an ad hoc categorization of these phenomena for each study. On the other hand, giving up the predefined categories amounts to conceiving that interaction is an open system. However, faced with many reports that show differences between observed performance and expected logical answers, can we still connect logic, reasoning and psychology? Which role is it possible to grant to logic to describe and interpret our daily reasoning? In the 'passably chaotic field of research on reasoning' [Andler, 1995, p. 31 ], a position consists in recognizing that human beings are equipped with a mental logic while another position consists in rejecting logic as a resource or a fundamental cognitive capacity. However, as Andler (1995) clearly showed, even if psychologists seem to have failed to isolate a fundamental logical ability (or 'its psychological counterpart which is a basic deductive skill'), today no tool can replace traditional logic in order to build or validate any kind of reasoning, even if a free field for many nonlogical processes exists, because traditional logic is not sufficient and must be supplemented.
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In order to take into account the fact that the objects of knowledge are being built gradually, the analysis tool should not start from a whole of pregiven objects. In addition, such a tool must involve both a constructivist and dialogical approach, if we subscribe to the assumption that conversation and reasoning are being built at the same time. Finally, this analysis tool must respect the empirical properties (or 'phenomenal Sorsana /Trognon constraints') of conversation [Trognon, 2002; Trognon, Batt, Rebuschi, & Sorsana, 2011] : (a) the conversational events are both actional and representational; (b) they are achieved sequentially, one by one; they are thus directed and irreversible; (c) their production is local (i.e., it is managed step by step) on a level jointly social and cognitive, and is distributed between interlocutors, and finally (d) they constitute an emergent architecture, organized hierarchically. Interlocutory logic was conceived as a function of the phenomenal properties of conversation in order to provide a language that formalizes the achievement of reasoning in interlocution. It allows us to demonstrate that a training -in the unfolding of the interaction or from the interaction -has taken place [Trognon & Batt, 2003; Trognon, Batt, & Sorsana, 2010; Trognon, Batt, Sorsana, & Saint Dizier de Almeida, 2011; Trognon et al., 2006 Trognon et al., , 2008 .
Characteristics of Interlocutory Logic
The goal of interlocutory logic is to formally express the indissolubly socio-cognitivo-discursive events that occur 'naturally' in the talk-in-interaction . In order to respect the empirical properties of the conversational events pointed out above, interlocutory logic combines a language (the language of the general semantics, and in a first approach, the language of the modal logic of the firstorder predicates) and logical methods (natural deduction, sequents, dialogical logics) [Trognon, Batt, Rebuschi, & Sosana, 2011] . More precisely, in order to grasp both the actional and the representational functions of the talk-in-interaction, the syntax of interlocutory logic depends on general semantics, a logic elaborated by Searle and Vanderveken from the speech acts discovered by Austin [Searle, 1969; Searle & Vanderveken, 1985; Trognon, Batt, Bromberg et al., in press; Vanderveken, 1990] . The speech acts -formalized as F(p), where F represents the actional function (or force) of the speech act and where p represents its representational function (or propositional content) -constitute sociocognitive bricks of the interpersonal exchange. It is from them that interlocutors make inferences about the speaker's meaning, and then about the meaning collectively assumed by them. The statements produced in context are analyzed by the F(p) formula and the p propositional content is expressed with the quantified modal first-order predicate logic combined with more 'primitive' logical languages. To approach the (indirect or implicit) speech act that is likely to be achieved in the interlocution, we confront the literal representation of the speech act potentially achieved by the speaker with the knowledge in relation to the contexts in which the statement is uttered [Trognon & Coulon, 2001] . Moreover, as we previously pointed out, the interlocutory events are accomplished sequentially, one by one, and they are like concatenations, hierarchically organized. Consequently, reasoning which occurs in the unfolding of the interlocution is represented with the method of natural deduction and more precisely, with the sequent calculation because this method presents the logical connectors as diagrams of inference, i.e., like processes, and so it can be applied to any type of reasoning (i.e., monotonous or nonmonotonous reasoning). Finally, interlocution is the product of the interlocutors' joint activity; in other words, it is distributed. To grasp this last property, we prefer to use the dialogical method among other methods in relation to intersubjective processes managing interlocution Trognon, Batt, Rebuschi, & Sorsana, 2011] . We will illustrate that in the following section. Human Development 2011; 54:204-233 
Interlocutory Logic of a Sequence of Coresolution of the Hanoi Tower Problem
We present a verbal sequence between two 8-year-old children, confronted with the joint resolution of the tower of Hanoi problem, in a traditional experimental design (pretest/social interaction/posttests). This research, carried out with a sample of 44 dyads, aimed at understanding how the positive versus negative relationships shared between children can support a differentiated social and cognitive management of the problem. Audrey and Vanessa are friends and have to build a 4-disk tower from peg A to peg C ( fig. 1 ) . In what follows, a sequence of their dialogue is presented. (Please note that the disks have different colors, where w = white, p = pink, g = green and b = brown.) 1Va:
Let's put it (disk w) there (peg B). 2:
(Coaction) 3Va:
Let's put it (disk p) there (peg C). 4:
(Coaction) 5Va:
After we take the other disk … 6Va:
Let's put it (disk w) there (peg C). 7:
(Coaction) 8Va:
Let's put it (disk g) there (peg B). 9:
(Coaction) 10:
(Lift up disk w) 11Va:
On the green (disk g). 12Au:
On the brown (disk b). 13Va1: No. 13Va2: On the green. 14Au1: No. 14Au2: Let's put the pink one there (on disk g). 15Va1: Wait, wait. 15Va2: (Looks at the experimenter) 15Va3: Let's put it on the green. 16Au1: No. 16Au2: Afterwards let's put that one there (disk p on disk g, using her hand gesture). 17Va1: Yes. 17Va2: But we must build the tower there (peg C). 17Va3: Ah yes. 17Va4: That's it. While the conversational sequence began with moves initiated by Vanessa and jointly carried out, Audrey who was previously very reserved opposed a contradictory proposal to Vanessa in remark 12Au, by justifying her choice in reference to the further move: they agreed about the choice of the disk to be moved (they lift up the white disk jointly) but they disagreed on the peg to put it on. The disagreement emerged following the simultaneous stating of two contradictory propositions [11Va: 'On the green (disk g)'; 12Au: 'On the brown (disk b)']. The dissension is formulated by Vanessa who disputed and repeated her proposal (13Va). It is increased by Audrey who disputed the dispute (in 14Au) by referring to a future move [14Au2: 'Let's put the pink one there (on disk g)']. This did not convince Vanessa who seemed to seek the experimenter's support by taking a look at her (15Va2) and she repeated her proposal once again (15Va3: 'Let's put it on the green'). Audrey maintained her dispute by reformulating the move which comes 'after' the move that she proposed and by miming the moves with her hands probably in order to try and make the anticipation of the 5th and 6th moves clearer (16Au). Vanessa put an end to her successive dissensions (in 17Va), after she pointed out the final goal of the task (i.e., to build the tower on peg C).
How shall we formalize the reasoning implemented by the children?
The Interlocutory Table in Order to Prepare Interlocution for Analysis. The transcription of the speech of each interlocutor is noted in two separate columns in order to materialize the property of dialogicity of a conversation. Each column is subdivided into subcolumns. In the first subcolumn the statements are registered, in the order of their appearance to respect the property of sequentiality of a dialogue. These ordered elements then receive their illocutory interpretations. The force of the speech act, defined by its goal, appears in the second subcolumn, the propositional content in the third one. In the middle columns, the analysis of the interstatement relations and the state of the world represented by the task and the children's body actions are noted step by step ( table 1 ) .
The Sequent of Dialogue as an Elementary Component of the Analysis of Interlocution.
This term -sequent of dialogue -is taken from logic and indicates a couple noted as follows: ⌫ ٛ F. ' ⌫ is a finite set of formulas. ⌫ represents the hypotheses that one can use. This set is also called the sequent context. F is a formula. It is the formula that one wants to demonstrate. This formula is said to be the conclusion of the sequent' [David, Nour, & Raffalli, 2003, p. 24] . Interlocutory logic adds the formulas of general semantics to the extension of the sequent. By adopting a way introduced by Carlson [1983] , each utterance is represented by an expression ⌽ of the system: ! M i , {M i-k }, {M i-k } ٛ M i , RD, DG 1 . M i is the conversational move accomplished by the utterance under examination. {M i-k } is the set of all the conversational moves that precede the move M i and from which M i follows. M i can then be conceived as a conclusion that results from premises {M i-k }. The reasoning that leads from {M i-k } to M i , and that is represented by the schema {M i-k } ٛ M i , is called, in logic, a sequent. RD is the whole of the rules of dialogue used by the speakers to accomplish their movements in the dialogue. Finally, DG corresponds to the dialogue game(s) played by the speakers in the analyzed sequence.
Let us consider the first utterance emitted by Audrey in the unfolding conversation about the problem resolution [12Au: 'On the brown (i.e., disk white on disk brown)']. This elliptic utterance is only a prepositional group. It is literally an assertive speech act and, nonliterally, a directive as well as a commissive speech (because a commissive act is a directive act that the speaker aims at himself). Its conversational function here is (a) to make a proposal for a joint action, and (b) in consequence, to refuse Vanessa's proposition (11Va) suggested in the preceding speech turn. Using expressions of the quantified modal first-order predicate logic, the propositional content of 12Au (i.e., the cognitive function of the speech act) is the modal expression that described a future action of the children, as follows [Trognon et al., 2008] : 12Au: E a {[shall E v+a (Awb)]}. E a means the (E) action achieved by Audrey (a). The propositional content of this action, [shall E v+a (Awb)], with the Awb formula meaning 'white disk on brown disk on peg A', is describing a state of the world (Awb) which would be realized in the future ('shall' is the modal marker of the future) by the joint action of the two girls, Vanessa and Audrey (E v+a ).
In order to be more understandable, we can simplify the formulas as presented below. Once the 9 coaction is carried out, the 4 disks arise on the pegs as follows: the brown disk is on peg A, so we write [A(-, -, -, b)], the green disk is on peg B, so we write [B(-, -, -, g)] and the white and pink disks are on peg C, so we write [C(-, -, w, p)]. When several disks are on the same peg, they are written from the smallest one to the biggest one. Thus, the overall configuration of pegs and disks is: [A(-, -, -, b) and B(-, -, -, g) and C(-, -, w, p)].
The different stages followed by the children until the preceding configuration are as follows: The children have two options when they lift up disk w. Either Vanessa and Audrey put it on peg B (on the green disk) as suggested by Vanessa, i.e., [B(-, -, w, g )], or they put it on peg A (on the brown disk) as suggested by Audrey, i.e., [A(-, -, w, b) ]. The choice is strategically decisive because the girls are very close to reaching an essential subgoal in the solution of the problem. In order to do so, they have to proceed from 9 as follows below:
Why is this procedural choice so crucial? From a logical standpoint, it is obvious that to move the white disk on the brown disk (Audrey's proposal) is more efficient than to move the white disk on the green disk (Vanessa's proposal) because, in the first proposal, the pink disk may be moved on the green one, then the white disk on the pink one, and finally the brown disk on peg C. From a psychological standpoint now, in their modeling of the solution of the problem, Richard and Poitrenaud [1988] and Richard [1991] demonstrate that in this solving stage, the participants (including adults) invent an additional rule, which consists in avoiding placing another disk on the larger disk -finally released -and favoring the movement of the white disk onto peg B.
From 11Va to 21Au, the children reached the best solution. However, they had to exceed a sociocognitive conflict before, which developed as follows. From 10 to 13Va2, the conflict emerged. Each girl stated the goal she wanted to carry out (11Va vs. 12Au), then the incompatibility with the partner's goal (13Va1 vs. 14Au1): the contradiction of the propositional contents involved an incompatibility of the acts [Searle & Vanderveken, 1985 ]. An argumentative phase followed, where each player argued her thesis (14Au2-16Au2 vs. 17Va2). Then, a phase of resolution may close the conflict, where one of the girls adopts the option initially suggested by her partner.
A simple reasoning ad absurdum leads each girl to deduce a contradiction by calculating her proposal with her partner's proposal taken as an assumption. Because each girl cannot indefinitely repeat her point of view, except by entering a 'dialogue of the deaf,' the children must adopt another dialogue game if they wish to prolong their cooperation. Then they engage in a mixed dialogue of argumentation [Rips, 1998; Walton & Krabbe, 1995] , which consists in persuading her partner by using a battery of strategies. One of these strategies is to challenge her partner to argue in favor of her own thesis. If a player receives a challenge, then he/she must put forward an argument, otherwise he/she loses the game. In this interaction, no chal-A (-, -, w, b) and B(-, -, -, g) and C(-, -, -, p) A(-, -, w, b) and B(-, -, p, g) and C (-, -, -, -) A (-, -, -, b) and B(-, w, p, g) and C (-, -, -, -) A(-, -, -, -) and B (-, w, p, g) and C (-, -, -, b) lenge is uttered, but the children put forward their arguments respectively. Let us examine both the justification put forward by Vanessa (17Va2) and the arguments uttered by Audrey in order to reject Vanessa's proposal (16Au1 + 16Au2). The former follows from the latter: (16Au1 + 16Au2) ] 17Va2.
According to the dialogue game theory of persuasion [Walton & Krabbe, 1995] , a player wins the game when he/she manages to demonstrate his/her thesis starting from the opponent's concessions. If we suppose that Vanessa took Audrey's assertions for assumptions in her own reasoning, then she should deduce 17Va2. Consequently, Vanessa has not got any more reason to reject Audrey's proposal. At this step of the task resolution, Audrey's proposal and Vanessa's both lead to the same situation -the release of the peg C -but Audrey's proposal remains strategically higher, because it makes it possible to reach a key subgoal of the problem more quickly. It is subjected to the condition that Vanessa's proposal will be followed by a move of the pink disk on the brown one, a proposal that is not uttered by Vanessa. In any case, the positive relationship between the two girls is likely to support the resolution of the disagreement (17Va3-4) . Therefore, they accomplished Audrey's solution (18) (19) , and Vanessa approved its accuracy (20Va) to Audrey's satisfaction, which she expresses with her smiles (21Au).
Vanessa will not need to devote herself to a comparative study of the consequences of both her proposal and Audrey's on the rest of the play to adopt her partner's standpoint: the interest of Audrey's proposal is 'staring her in the face.' In other words, Vanessa's understanding (17Va3: 'ah yes;' 17Va4: 'that's it') seems connected to the fact that Audrey's proposal was compatible with the recall (made by Vanessa) that the tower must be built on peg C. Finally Vanessa accepted her partner's proposal, as if the fact of being a friend and of obtaining satisfaction to the request formulated in 17Va2 was enough. The positive relationship between the two girls here functioned as 'an affective operator' which prevented the interaction from becoming a 'dialogue of the deaf.' In addition, the success of Audrey's strategy, that the children will then test, reinforced their decision positively. It may be thanks to a contingent interaction like the one that we have just examined that Audrey and Vanessa acquired the solution of the tower of Hanoi problem.
Conclusion
Human activities are never carried out in a social vacuum. So why do we persist in studying the cognitive development and functioning of a virtual 'monad'? According to Bruner [1990] , the study of the human mind is so difficult, so deeply entangled in the dilemma of being at the same time the object and the agent of its own study, that psychologists should not limit their ways of thinking to those borrowed from physics. A psychological analysis of the contextual determination of human thinking can find a heuristic way of combining methods [Deleau, 2004; Hinde, Perret-Clermont, & Stevenson-Hinde, 1985; Richelle, 1993; Shotter, 1990; Wassmann & Dasen, 2006] . At the end of their book, which proposed to clarify the methodological criteria for identifying interactional events, Duncan and Fiske [1985] wrote, however:
The challenge to interaction research is to devise methods for dealing with this ongoing effect of each participant upon the other. To an essayist or interaction theorist, the process of common participation (not to mention continual mutual influence) might appear as a Trying to 'clinically' establish the impact of interaction structures and their products on a cognitive individual's performance is a promising avenue of investigation, and a difficult task that consists of disentangling the processes that lead to the expression of knowledge that is 'distributed' between interlocutors and 'situated' in a dynamic interpersonal and sociocultural context.
